By TESSA JAMANDRE
HAD People Power failed to stop the tanks on EDSA, February 25, 1986 would have been the second time that the country would be under martial law. And among its implementers would have been Marines Col. Ariel Querubin, who had figured in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts against President Cory Aquino and implicated in the alleged plan to withdraw support from President Gloria Arroyo in February 2006.
In 1986, Querubin was a captain under the command of Marines Commander Brigadier Gen. Artemio Tadiar. and was tasked to crack the coup plot in February 1986.
Querubin’s arrest of mutineers that uncovered the plot to assault Malacanang compelled the rebels to change their strategy, thus preventing a clash between Palace guards reinforced by the Marines and those who broke off from the ranks to execute the order “to arrest Marcos but to employ necessary force if resistance is encountered.” Then Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan, the leader of the rebel soldiers, who is now a senator, thanked Querubin for the unintended consequence of the arrest.
Then Navy Capt. Rex Robles, leader of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), who was assigned to act as a liaison with the diplomatic community, conceded that the arrests of RAM officers was the game-changer. With the battle-hardened Marines stationed at the main point of attack, “Honasan and his group would have been decimated,” he said.
Querubin said,“While my heart was with them (the reformist soldiers), I didn’t want to change horses midstream.” He has just returned from schooling in Australia, when events leading to the ouster of the late strongman were unfolding. Tadiar was instrumental for his military course abroad.
Querubin was assigned to do intelligence work to secure the shaky government of the late strongman. While reports of a coup d’etat were being verified, the government was also up for counter-intelligence.
Robles said the coup plot already leaked as early as January 1986 after LTCOL Rodolfo Aguinaldo was talked out into explaining their need for more anti-tank weapons by an Israeli arms dealer who passed on the information to the US Embassy. RAM leaders learned that Marcos was informed of the plot. But when it will be launched remained unknown. It was supposedly set on February 21.
Querubin recalled the military was placed on red alert at the start of the week as they were laying the ground for what would have been another martial law declaration on February 25. He was ordered to abduct Manila Times publisher Joaquin “Chino” Roces, while businessman Jose Concepcion was assigned to another Marines Lt. Espridion Javier.
Querubin completed surveillance operation on Roces and even managed to enter his home when he was invited over for a drink by then Marines Capt. Nelson Allaga who is Roces’ son-in-law.
But before he can execute the order, the military had been confronted with a bigger and more imminent threat. Reports of the assassination attempt against the President had been confirmed. Querubin had been tapped to be on guard against mutineers in the ranks.
On or about 10pm on February 21, Querubin effected the arrest of 19 soldiers led by Lt. Michael Aspirin. While Aspirin would have gotten off the hook easily being the security detail of Trade & Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin, Querubin knew there was more to their suspicious movements around camp near the residence of Tadiar. Threatened to be brought to El Fraile, an island off Cavite known to be an execution site, Aspirin bared details of the planned assault on Malacanang.
This led to the arrest of RAM members Lt. Col. Jake Malahacan, Majors Allen Querubin (Ariel’s cousin), Saulito Aromin, Ricardo Brillantes and Capt. Ricardo Morales, who were part of the combat teams that were supposed to support Honasan who was to cross the Pasig River to attack Malacañang and neutralize the Marcoses. Marcos presented to media the captured plotters.
But Marcos’credibility had hit rock bottom by then, nobody believed him even if he was speaking the truth.
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile was briefed about the rapidly evolving situation and was presented two options: launch guerrilla warfare in the countryside which was rejected because it cannot be sustained and that Enrile believed to only end up with all of them getting killed. The second option, taking a stand in the city to storm out the crisis, was what Edsa was all about.
Tasked to confront Enrile and then military vice chief of staff Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos, Tadiar led a contingent of battle-ready Marines with tanks and armored vehicles to Edsa. But they were stopped by tens of thousands of people along Ortigas Avenue, about two kilometers from the camps. Querubin stood with his commander there. Tadiar asked the crowds to clear the way but nuns armed with rosaries knelt in front of the tanks and men and women with arms linked together blocked the troops. In the end, the troops retreated with no shots fired.
And the rest is history.