THE Incident Investigation and Review Committee on the August 23 hostage-taking identified eight critical incidents that turned the crisis into a tragedy, the report made available to the public today showed.
They are:
1.The Crisis Management Committee was not activated in accordance with the Manual on the activation of a Crisis Management Committee (CMC). Mayor Alfredo Lim of the City of Manila was the person in authority charged with the duty of activating the CMC.
2. The improper appreciation of the nature of the demand of the hostage taker was the Second Critical Incident. How or when the demand for “an order for reinstatement to the service” was convoluted to “a letter promising to review Mendoza’s case” by the Ombudsman could not be satisfactorily explained by the authorities concerned. If it was intentional, then a proper assessment of its implications should have been made. The tenor of the letter was simply, a promise for further delay of the already delayed resolution of Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration.
3. The presentation to Mendoza of the letter from the Ombudsman and the resulting breakdown of negotiations. At this point the expectations of Mendoza that his demand for and Order for reinstatement was high because this was reinforced by the assurances from the Ombudsman and the Vice Mayor.
4.The acts, omissions and reaction, of the authorities concerned with resolving the crisis situation, to the initial breakdown (the third Critical Incident) .
Immediately upon return of the Negotiating Team, with Gregorio (brother of hostage-taker Senior Inspector Rolando mendoza, to the Advance Command Post, Col. Yebra accused Gregorio of being a conspirator and an accessory. Whether he was shouting or not is not really material. The fact is Col. Yebra displayed his loss of focus on the task at hand. He was distracted by a peripheral matter.
More important to addressing the actuations of Gregorio was re-building the confidence of Mendoza, re-establishing contact with him, and salvaging the negotiations that clearly broke down, by working on the offered alternative solution. Instead, Col. Yebra, Mayor Lim, Gen. Magtibay, and other police officers present focused on handling the peripheral matter involving Gregorio resulting to Mayor Lim’s order for Gregorio’s arrest, looking for handcuffs, and conferring on how to handle Gregorio. By attending to the peripheral matter, precious time to salvage the negotiations, already critical at this late hour of the crisis situation, was lost. The windows of opportunity were closing.
5.The arrest of Gregorio Mendoza upon orders of Mayor Lim.
Viewed in perspective, this was the proximate cause of the chain of events that led to Mendoza’s shooting at the Hostages. The potential adverse reaction of Mendoza to an arrest of Gregorio was not lost to Mayor Lim. This is borne by his instruction to the escorting officers to use the back door of the Advance Command Post to avoid media. That Mendoza was viewing television at this time was already known at this point. The instruction to avoid media should be taken in this context.
6. The departure of Mayor Lim and General Magtibay from the Advance Command Post at a crucial time was the Sixth Critical Incident.
Immediately preceding events aggravated by lack of evaluation of their implications, compounded by error in judgment, resulted in the Sixth Critical Event. The absence of Mayor Lim and General Magtibay in the Advance Command Post created a vacuum in command or decision makers. This resulted in the inability of those present to handle crisis events as they unfolded. Everything that Mayor Lim and General Magtibay hoped to accomplish at Emerald Restaurant, including taking a meal, could have been accomplished at the Advance Command Post and even better because they would have been in a position to react to events promptly.
The most significant of events that transpired after Mayor Lim and General Magtibay left the Advance Command Post were the coverage of Gregorio being arrested, the deadlines being given by Mendoza before he starts shooting the hostages and the actual shooting of hostages.
7. The inefficient, disorganized and stalled assault brought about the Seventh Critical Incident. The manner by which the assault on the bus, to rescue the hostages and take down Mendoza, was carried out was the convergence of efficiencies omitted, and inefficiencies committed, through-out the day.
There was an absence of relevant intelligence information that could have aided the formulation and execution of a proper assault plan, including the choice of equipment needed to efficiently carry out the same. The information about the emergency exit door, the emergency button to open the main door and the strength of material of the window panels were vital information. Unfortunately, from the very start, there was no intelligence gathering sub-group activated.
8. The absence of an organized Post Assault Plan.
What transpired immediately after the neutralization of Mendoza clearly demonstrated the absence of a Post Assault Plan or the inefficient manner such a plan was carried out, if indeed there was a plan. There was no crowd control that resulted in by standers rushing to the immediate vicinity of the bus thereby hampering evacuation of hostages. Media reporters were even allowed to board ambulances. There was also no clear coordination with medical facilities as shown by the testimony that victims were rejected by one hospital because they could no longer be accommodated. Time was lost in traveling to the next nearest hospital.
Click here for the fact finding part of the report.
President Aquino referred the recommendations of the IIRC to Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa and Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Eduardo de Mesa for review.
The IIRC, headed by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima, turned over the report to Aquino last Friday. Malacañang gave a complete copy of the report to Chinese ambassador Liu Jianchao Monday morning. The report minus the recommendations was released to media in the afternoon.
Aquino said the committee receommended sanctions to 12 persons and three TV networks that covered the incident.
The 12 are :
Then Philippine National Police (PNP) chief Jesus Verzosa;
* Then Manila Police District chief Rodolfo Magtibay, who served as ground commander;
* National Capital Region Police office chief Leocadio Santiago;
* Hostage negotiator Manila Superintendent Orlando Yebra;
* DILG Undersecretary Rico Puno;
* Chief Inspector Santiago Pascual, head of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team;
* Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez;
* Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzalez III;
* TV5′s Erwin Tulfo;
* Radio Mo Nationwide’s (RMN) Michael Rogas;
* Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim
* Manila Vice-Mayor Isko Moreno